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ABSTRACT
Responding to increased calls for uniform standards in higher education accreditation, this
paper uses punctuated equilibrium theory to ask whether bright lines will have disproportionate
impacts on various institution types in higher education. Using ordinary least squares and logistic
regressions, I analyze the impacts of predominant degree granted, profit structure, and institutional
ownership on 150 percent time completion rates, student loan default rates, and debt to earnings
ratio. The results suggest that bright lines in completion rate would disproportionately impact
institutions based on predominant degree granted, profit structure, and institutional ownership.
Bright lines in student loan default rate would disproportionately impact institutions based on
profit structure and institutional ownership, while bright lines in debt to earnings ratio would
disproportionately impact institutions based on institutional ownership alone. The wide variation
present in these institutions makes a uniform bright line impractical and unfairly punitive. These
results are significant and robust, suggesting that the federal government must find a new method
of standardizing the accreditation process.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Higher education in the United States has historically been accredited with little oversight from
the federal government. Private accreditors have been given nearly free reign over the process,
selecting the criteria they will use to determine if postsecondary institutions are behaving as they
should and providing the outcomes they must. Given the federal government’s annual investment
in higher education, exceeding $160 billion in fiscal year 2015, there has been increasing focus on
how the federal government can use accreditors to protect their investment (Baum, Ma, Pender,
Bell, 2015). One such proposed mechanism for standardizing the process is the implementation
of minimum (or maximum) thresholds schools must achieve in specified areas. These benchmarks,
referred to in this paper as bright lines, would trigger a removal of accreditation if they are breached.
Removal of accreditation leaves a postsecondary institution unable to collect federal funds. This is
a near-guaranteed death sentence for any institution.
This paper’s theoretical argument is based in punctuated equilibrium theory. I argue that
the federal government is reaching a point of punctuated equilibrium in higher education policy,
where a sudden shift to increased government oversight of the accreditation process could occur
at any moment. I examine bright lines that have been proposed in the areas of completion rates,
student loan default rates, and debt to earnings ratios. These bright lines allow me to answer the
core question of this research paper: Would proposed bright lines have a disproportionate impact
on various groups within higher education? Specifically, I analyze the difference in effect size
between two-year and four-year institutions, for-profit and not-for-profit institutions, and public
and private institutions. I analyze these topics first using ordinary least squares regression to
determine if a relationship exists between each dependent and independent variable. I next use
logistic regression to determine whether there exists a disproportionate relationship when regressed
against the dichotomous variable of passing or failing on each proposed bright line.
2My results show that a bright line in completion rate would disproportionately impact insti-
tutions based on their predominant degree granted, profit structure, and institutional ownership.
A bright line in student loan default rate would disproportionately impact institutions based on
predominant degree granted, profit structure, and institutional ownership. Finally, a bright line in
debt to earnings ratio would disproportionately impact institutions based on institutional owner-
ship alone. These findings suggest that bright lines, as currently proposed by the higher education
policy community, should not be applied equally to all institution types, lest an economic shock
be placed on the higher education community. Finally, I suggest that policymakers consider this
format when analyzing any possible future bright lines, checking to see that they do not unfairly
hamper a particular type of institution.
3CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literature on higher education accreditation focuses primarily on the evolution of accredi-
tation over time. Scholars provide historical perspectives of the processes that drove accreditation
to exist initially, as well as the changes that have occurred in the past several centuries. Ad-
ditional literature focuses on the mechanisms of higher education accreditation and the possible
implementation of bright-line indicators, defined within this chapter.
2.1 Literature Review
2.1.1 History of higher education accreditation
American higher education can trace its roots back to the founding of Harvard College in 1636
(Brittingham, 2009). By the beginning of the American Revolution, the number of chartered
colleges had increased to nine. While there was very little diversity of curriculum and less than one
percent of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds were enrolled, these schools represented the beginnings
of a now thriving system (Snyder, 1993). Without regulation, the higher education space became
an attractive arena for entrepreneurs hoping to establish a well-respected institution. With nearly
1,000 institutions of higher education developed by 1880, it had become difficult to discriminate the
education provided by secondary schools and colleges. Further, there was concern among existing
colleges that new schools would implement less rigorous academic standards, weakening the value
of college degrees overall. The solution, they concluded, was to form voluntary organizations that
could provide and uphold educational standards among colleges.
The first accrediting agency was founded in 1885 as the New England Association of Colleges
and Secondary Schools to accredit all schools in their region (Ewell, 2008). Their founding led other
regions to create similar entities: the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools (1887),
North Central Association of Schools and Colleges (1895), Southern Association of Colleges and
4Schools (1895), Northwest Association of Colleges and Universities (1917), and Western Association
of Schools and Colleges (1924). Each of these regional accreditors was established as a voluntary,
non-governmental organization with no mechanism to require enrollment. In the early stages of
their existence, they relied on esteemed institutions to join and set a precedent for all others to
follow, using peer pressure to encourage uniformity of curriculum. It was not until 1913 that the
North Central Association adopted membership standards, and the term accreditation was not
used by any association until periodic review systems were instituted in the 1950s (Ewell, 2008).
Today’s mission-oriented accreditation approach was developed by the North Central Association
in 1934, as the industry shifted to a system designed to support institutional diversity.
The federal government did not become directly involved in the accreditation process until
passage of the Servicemens Readjustment Act of 1944, often referred to as the G.I. Bill (Rose,
1990). This legislation provided funding for veterans of World War II who had experienced an
interruption in their education. Returning servicemen could receive funding for up to four years of
tuition, fees, books, and supplies as well as a living stipend (Olson, 1974). This bill caused a large
increase in federal dollars to colleges and universities that had previously seen very little, if any,
federal support. As federal spending increased, so did a desire for oversight of education quality.
The Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952, known as the Korean G.I. Bill, allocated larger sums
for higher education. It also allowed the federal government to lean on pre-existing accreditors
and their systems of quality assurance. As long as these accreditors could ensure that veterans
were receiving a quality education rather than falling victim to diploma mills, this system allowed
the federal government to ensure a quality education for program participants without footing the
accreditation bill (Thrash, 2016).
Federal involvement in accreditation was fully developed with the passage of the Higher Ed-
ucation Act (HEA) of 1965. This act expanded federal aid to students and shifted the govern-
ments standards for disbursing loans. The HEA created guidelines for institutions to follow to
receive federal funding (Hegji, 2016). Reauthorizations of the HEA in 1972, 1992, 1998, and 2008
provided further detail on the relationship between federal money and accreditation. The 1972
5reauthorization increased federal grant aid while opening up money for for-profit institutions, but
tightened restrictions on accreditation status. The 1992 reauthorization added oversight to student
aid programs, creating review agencies to serve as industry watchdogs and giving the Secretary of
Education authority to oversee accreditation processes. The 1998 reauthorization eliminated state
review agencies and centralized power in the federal process. This reauthorization also decreased
requirements for regional accreditors. The 2008 HEA reauthorization served as a congressional tool
for reigning in the power of the Secretary of Education and accreditors, returning the process to a
mission-based focus (Morgan, 2008). This most recent reauthorization led to the current state of
accreditation.
2.1.2 Higher education accreditation today
The purpose of todays system of accreditation remains largely unchanged from the early 20th
century. Accreditors of traditional four-year colleges and universities retain their regional authority
in controlling the quality of institutions. These seven regional accreditors are responsible for over-
sight of nearly all traditional institutions. Schools that do not fall within the purview of regional
accreditors are generally accredited by national entities that specialize in a particular field or col-
lege type. For instance, the majority of faith-based institutions in the United States are accredited
by one of five faith-related accrediting organizations (Council for Higher Education Accreditation,
2017). These national accreditors serve as overseers of career schools, professional programs, and
distance education/online learning.
While each accreditor is granted autonomy in their task of overseeing institutions in their region
or specialty, the federal government’s stake in supervising and approving accreditation decisions
remains stringent. As Matthew Finkin notes, the issue of ”who watches the watchman?” is very
real in todays system of increased scrutiny (2009). The U.S. Department of Education (USDE) is
responsible for vetting accreditors and their work, with ultimate authority granted to the Secretary
of Education. The Department of Education uses a combination of department staff who produce
thorough reports on each accreditor and the actions of their affiliated schools, and the National
6Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) chartered in the HEA of
2008, to advise the department on issues of accreditation (U.S. Department of Education, 2017).
NACIQI is an 18-member body with knowledge and professional backgrounds in higher educa-
tion. The members of the committee serve six-year terms and are appointed equally by the House
of Representatives, the Senate, and the Secretary of Education (U. S. Department of Education,
2017). Through a system of site visits to university campuses, detailed reporting structures, and
statistical audits like the accreditor dashboard, NACIQI is tasked with holding regular hearings
to determine whether accreditors should be granted renewal of recognition or their recognition as
accreditors should be terminated. Developed in 2016, the accreditor dashboard compiles data from
the Federal Student Aid (FSA) Data Center, the USDE College Scorecard, and the Postsecondary
Education Participants System (PEPS) to issue reports on the health of USDE accreditors and
their institutions (NACIQI, 2017). While they have been criticized in the past for exhibiting too
much leniency, NACIQI has established a history of holding accreditors accountable and releasing
policy reports with far-reaching implications in the higher education community (NACIQI, 2012).
Despite the layers involved in accreditation through the USDE and NACIQI, the underlying
importance of their stamp of approval remains singular: safeguarding Title IV funding. As A.
Lee Fritschler makes clear in his work Accreditations Dilemma: Serving Two Masters Universities
and Governments, the existing accreditation process has shifted from its focus on serving students
and institutions to allowing the federal government to watch the impact of their investment in
higher education (2008). Title IV of the HEA contains the lions share of federal loan and grant
money. The HEA requires that institutions be accredited and remain in compliance with USDE
standards to access Title IV funding for their students (HEOA , 2008). Many critics of this bond
between accreditation and Title IV funds argue that it creates a singular focus for both the federal
government and institutions (Gillen, Bennett, Vedder, 2010).
While the federal government has developed command over the accreditation process, private
sector actors have also increased their presence. The Council for Higher Education Accreditation
(CHEA) was founded in 1996 to serve as a nongovernmental source of oversight to the accredita-
7tion process (Bloland, 2001). Often acting in concert with the federal government, CHEA offers
an alternative perspective on institutional success and the role accreditors should play in quality
control for higher education. In addition to mirroring the processes used by the USDE in accred-
iting institutions, CHEA adds an emphasis on mission-based evaluation that reaches back to the
beginnings of accreditation (CHEA, 2010). CHEA provides a seal of accreditation that operates
entirely separately from the USDE. The CHEA accreditation process is less rigorous and is not tied
to student aid funding.
2.1.3 Intended outcomes in higher education
While it is certainly valuable to know how higher education accreditation has evolved and where
it stands in todays overall system of higher education, it is perhaps more important to understand
the struggle faced in determining the outcome variables for which accreditors and universities
should be held accountable. A lack of consensus in the education community has created a system
wherein individual accreditors and institutions determine the outcomes by which they should be
judged (Ewell, 2008). This system of hand-picked outcomes disclosure has faced increased scrutiny
lately, with NACIQI and independent education groups seeking a unified system of disclosures
that allow all schools and accreditors to be compared to one another (Lederman, 2017). One such
attempt at unification of outcome variables has been the development of the USDEs Accreditation
Dashboard. This tool, inspired by NACIQIs most recent written report to the USDE, compares
accreditors through compilation of information from their member institutions (NACIQI, 2015).
While this is an important step toward standardizing higher education learning outcomes, it falls
shy of many calls for reform.
Critics of higher education accreditation often note that the emphasis on institutional mission
and various other intangibles produces a layer of security between accreditors and their overseers at
the USDE. The federal government spent more than $160 billion on student financial aid in fiscal
year 2015 (Baum, Ma, Pender, Bell, 2015). While a large portion of this investment consisted of
student loans that will be paid back with interest, several billion dollars were allocated for non-
8repayable grants and scholarships. With such a large investment in higher education, the federal
government has a direct interest in assuring students receive valuable outcomes. This problem is
further complicated by the wide scope of higher education institutions that exist today. While
subject-specific accreditors are largely responsible for overseeing like institutions, there exists great
variation for the regional accreditors who must supervise the operations of 4-year and 2-year private
and public institutions. Accrediting such diverse institutions is an arduous task for accreditors,
but it provides even more complexity for the USDE and NACIQI. These bodies are indirectly
responsible for such great numbers of institutions that they necessarily must find shortcuts by
which to govern.
One proposed shortcut that has circulated throughout the higher education policy arena is for
the USDE and NACIQI to develop universal benchmarks to be met by all institutions, referred to
as bright-line rules. Although Congress added language to the HEOA 2008 reauthorization specifi-
cally barring creation of bright-line rules, the concept has been continually mentioned in the higher
education space (National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, 2010). Trends sug-
gest that bright-line rule-making will be a point of contention in the next HEOA reauthorization,
but little research exists to determine where lines could, or should, be drawn to balance student
success with institutional mission (Lederman, 2017). Further, researchers have failed to identify
consistently which variables should be included in judging the performance of institutions, leaving
a pressing need for identification of said variables. Continued calls for policy change and repeated
mention of bright-line rule-making from NACIQI show that the industry may be reaching a crucial
tipping point. This tipping point would promise an abrupt, broad scale shift in the federal govern-
ments relationship with higher education accreditors and institutions, punctuating an equilibrium
that has existed for decades.
2.1.4 Use of bright lines in education
The concept of bright-line rule-making in education is far from novel. There have been several
historical and contemporary uses of bright lines as a method of determining acceptable standards
9for education quality in elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education. By their nature,
bright lines are designed to produce consistent results through their application, denoting a clear
outcome associated with crossing the line. Bright lines historically have been a contentious issue in
higher education accreditation, with accreditors actively opposing their implementation (Lederman,
2017). This opposition found mouthpieces in the USDE and Congress, which resulted in bright
lines being expressly prohibited in the last reauthorization of the HEOA (Hegji, 2016). However,
the USDE announced in July 2018 that it would open a new round of rule-making on topics to
include accreditation, considering in part the measures used by accreditors to evaluate member
institutions (Kelderman, 2018). Additionally, recent conversations within NACIQI meetings and
the higher education think tank community have suggested that future legislation may reintroduce
bright lines as a method of outcomes assessment (Lederman, 2017). Think tanks that have weighed
in on this issue include the Center for American Progress, the Heritage Foundation, the Century
Foundation, and New America.
Even without federally mandated bright lines, several programmatic accreditors have begun us-
ing bright lines in their own outcomes assessments. According to a 2016 report by the Association
of Specialized and Professional Accreditors (ASPA), 58 percent of accreditors surveyed employed
bright lines that relate to graduation or retention rates, placement rates for employment or in-
ternships, or licensure exam pass rates for professions (ASPA, 2016). While this bodes well for the
accreditation of specialized programs and indicates a shift in how the government may soon accredit
national and for-profit programs, it does very little to impact much of traditional higher education.
The regional accreditors responsible for accrediting over 90 percent of traditional two- and four-year
institutions have no such bright lines in use (Alacbay, 2016). This failure to adopt similar bright
lines has led to lower standards in nearly every outcome category throughout regionally accredited
schools (Alacbay, 2016).
10
2.2 Theory and Causal Mechanisms
2.2.1 Punctuated equilibrium theory
Initially derived from the natural sciences, punctuated equilibrium theory allows researchers to
examine abrupt shifts in policy rather than incremental changes that occur over time. Whereas
equilibrium represents the status quo over time, a punctuation represents a political imbalance
or the involvement of previously uninvolved actors that cause the abrupt change. The increased
authority found by NACIQI in the years since its inception paired with a relatively new and
volatile USDE administration may provide the perfect combination for this punctuation to occur.
Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that these new actors are in a unique position to destroy
policy monopolies of the past and implement their own processes, including a policy of bright-line
rule-making in higher education accreditation.
One key indicator of an impending punctuation is the disproportionate attention being afforded
to the accreditation process in recent years. What once was largely a process that took place out of
sight and out of mind has been thrust into the spotlight more frequently in the past decade. The
2016 revocation of federal recognition for the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and
Schools (ACICS) and subsequent reversal by Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos in 2018 cast a
national spotlight on the federal governments relationship with both accreditors and institutional
standards (Kelderman, 2018). The increased national scrutiny has forced policymakers to focus
more intensely on the existing processes and how they may be changed. Because the ACICS saga
shone a negative light on the ability of the federal government to adequately control an accreditor,
this provided renewed calls for more standardized, bright-line rules.
Punctuated equilibrium theory also provides insight into the framing that has allowed for policy
monopolies to form in higher education accreditation. Accreditors existed prior to the federal
governments involvement in higher education, and this is clearly reflected in the policies that govern
their relationship. Accreditors have traditionally held incredible amounts of power in determining
what their processes should include and how they should communicate with the USDE. Early
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policies surrounding the dispersal of federal funding were far more lenient toward accreditors than
they were toward institutions, and this has remained largely unchanged. This institutionalized
notion that accreditors need not be highly scrutinized stemmed from the ability of accreditors to
frame the conversation as a matter of expertise delegation rather than a tiered management system.
Accreditors need not answer to the USDE but should instead be provided with flexibility to act
as the utmost authority on quality control for higher education institutions. This relationship has
been strained in the past decade, particularly with the Trump administrations influence on higher
education policy. Calls for change have cast doubt upon this policy monopoly and have allowed
the USDE and NACIQI to wield greater influence.
Punctuated equilibrium theory provides a crucial background for understanding the potential
transition from traditional accreditation to bright-line rule-making. The change occurring in the
USDE and its affiliated groups will likely lead to bright-line rule-making being implemented and
would subsequently lead to higher levels of accreditor action toward or against institutions of higher
education.
2.3 The Argument
Bright-line indicators serve as an effective benchmarking tool by which accreditors evaluate
their member institutions. Accreditors have long held individual criteria for measuring the success
of programs, without any underlying guideline to connect all Title IV-funded institutions. Bright-
line indicators serve as a remedial measure, creating a minimum threshold schools must meet in
order to receive Title IV funding. Schools with completion rates below 25 percent, student loan
default rates above 30 percent, and a debt to income ratio greater than 1.0 are doing their students
a disservice by not meeting fundamentally crucial aspects of a postsecondary education. While
using these measures individually may not provide an accurate portrayal of how successful a school
is, combining them gives a clearer picture. A formula that weighs all factors against one another
to determine overall success of graduates will satisfy the targeting concerns mentioned frequently
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in the literature, while also addressing low return rates. When taken individually, there is ample
evidence to suggest that these measures have measurable impacts on the success of students.
2.3.1 Completion rate
Completion rate is perhaps the most frequently mentioned measure of institutional success.
Though there is an inherent value in the knowledge gained during a postsecondary education, the
ultimate goal for the traditional student is to receive a degree, symbolizing an increased amount of
both knowledge and educational sophistication along with providing a tangible proof of expertise
for employers. It is important to note that the USDE measures completion rate in two ways. The
first method examines how many students graduate with their intended degree within the amount
of time suggested by the program, i.e. four years for a four-year degree or two years for a two-year
degree. The second method, used in this study, examines how many students graduate with their
intended degree within 150 percent of the amount of time suggested by the program, i.e. six years
for a four-year degree or three years for a two-year degree.
Despite its popularity as a broad measure of collegiate success, there is little agreement on
the minimum acceptable standards for postsecondary completion rate. One debate centers on the
admissions standards of a school. Opponents of a broad-scale bright line in higher education note
that there is an inherent advantage granted to more selective institutions. These schools are able to
select students with higher completion potential based on financial, academic, and extracurricular
information provided in the application process. By selecting students who have traditionally
performed at a high level, these institutions are able to artificially inflate their completion rates.
This argument places four-year institutions at a completion rate advantage, as they have historically
held tighter admissions standards. For this reason, I hypothesize that four-year institutions will
have higher 150 percent time completion rates than two-year schools.
Another historically relevant variable in determining completion rate is the profit structure of
an institution. For-profit institutions have more to gain by holding on to students longer, allowing
them to make more money without recruiting a new student to fill their place. For this reason,
13
I hypothesize that for-profit institutions will have lower 150 percent time completion rates than
not-for-profit schools.
These arguments are both made clear in the 2017 NCES data, following a cohort from 2010
to 2016. This sample showed that institutional selectivity played a large role in determining the
completion rate of a school (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). At four-year insti-
tutions, schools with open admissions policies graduated 32 percent of students within six years
while schools with acceptance rates less than 25 percent graduated 88 percent of students within
six years. The same data show that six year completion rates were 59 percent at public institutions,
66 percent at private not-for-profit institutions, and 26 percent at for-profit institutions. Due to
these figures and a renewed call for oversight, there is precedent for bright lines in completion rate
monitoring.
In 2016, the Council of Regional Accrediting Commissions, an organization formed whose mem-
bership is comprised of the seven regional accreditors, called for four-year member institutions to
have six-year completion rates above 25 percent and two-year institutions to have three-year com-
pletion rates above 15 percent (Kreighbaum, 2016). This proposal did not include a punishment
but instead opted to have schools falling below these thresholds submit a plan of how they will
improve the numbers over time. The results of this study, released in 2018, showed that a total of
397 institutions (14 percent of regionally accredited schools) fell below the threshold (Fain, 2018).
In response to this number, the Council of Regional Accrediting Commissions opted to review
their parameters, shifting to a 5.6 year expectation for two-year degrees, meeting the average time
expectation released by the National Student Clearinghouse. This study also showed that publicly
owned schools had lower 150 percent time completion rates than privately owned institutions. For
this reason, I hypothesize that my study will show a similar effect.
2.3.2 Student loan default rate
The percentage of students using federal student loan money to finance their postsecondary
education has increased over time, as has the amount of money being borrowed by the average
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student. The Postsecondary National Policy Institute (PNPI) notes that the volume of new federal
loans has risen from $42 billion in 1990 to $97 billion in 2018 (Postsecondary National Policy
Institute, 2018). The same report shows that the number of borrowers for undergraduate student
loans had increased from 5.1 million in 2007 to 7.7 million in 2012, rising to previously unseen
levels. There are myriad explanations for the increasing amount of student loan debt. These
explanations include increasing college cost, wage stagnation, increasing enrollment, and relaxed
federal loan standards. There are also a number of explanations for increasing student loan default
rates, explaining how they can and should vary by type of institution.
Defaulting on a federal loan means that the borrower has gone 270 days without making a
payment when they otherwise are expected to pay. The USDE data released in 2018 shows that
10.8 percent of student borrowers who entered repayment in 2015 had defaulted by the end of a
three-year period (U.S. Department of Education, 2018). One factor that causes variation in default
rates is the cost structure of schools. Private and for-profit institutions are more likely to rely on
tuition as their primary income. This often leads to a higher average cost burden for students
than at public institutions. For this reason, I hypothesize that student loan default rates will be
higher at private institutions than at public institutions, and will be higher at for-profit institutions
than at not-for-profit institutions. Another commonly referenced factor is the amount of student
loan education provided by institutions. While all institutions receiving federal aid are required to
provide exit counseling to students with federal loan debt, not all schools provide the process with
similar attention. Schools providing minimal amounts of loan education to students may increase
the likelihood of defaulting for their students, as students with more knowledge will be able to more
easily navigate the loan environment and seek more appropriate repayment options.
A final consideration should be given to the overall value of a degree. Students who receive
degrees that are not as valuable in the competitive market will be less capable of paying their
student loan debt. As a result, these students are more likely to default on their federal loans.
Traditionally, four-year degrees have provided higher earnings potential than two-year degrees. For
this reason, I hypothesize that student loan default rates will be higher at two-year-institutions than
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at four-year-institutions. The federal government has enforced a pseudo-bright line in restricting
aid to schools with high default rates. As the law currently stands, institutions can lose federal loan
and grant eligibility if their default rate exceeds 30 percent for three consecutive years or 40 percent
for one year (Kreighbaum, 2018). These lines are seldom crossed, as they are set quite high for
the percentage of students who traditionally default. Student loan stagnation refers to the period
of time prior to default when no payments are being collected and the loan interest continues to
increase. Repayment stagnation rates are typically indicative of impending default. For this reason,
student loan default rates and repayment stagnation rates will be analyzed together.
2.3.3 Debt to earnings ratio
Median debt of completers is an important metric for understanding the financial burden borne
by a student in pursuit of a degree. This figure allows the federal government to track which schools
have higher tuition and fees on average, as well as where federal money is being spent. Median post-
baccalaureate earnings fills in the other side of the equation for the federal government. This metric
allows the government to see which institutions are offering degrees that will allow students to repay
their federal loan debt and helps with forecasting the speed at which that debt will be collected.
Median earnings have been measured at various time frames after graduation, but consistently
illuminate the earnings differences associated with varying programs of study and institutions.
The financial value of a postsecondary degree is contingent on the price paid to receive the
degree compared to the additional earnings received as a result of degree attainment. In order to
determine the value, we must therefore know the debt of graduates and the earnings those graduates
receive upon completion of their degree. These variables have much more value in conjunction with
one another, as a high value in one does not necessarily mean a high value in the other. For
instance, a graduate may have a tremendous amount of debt, but his may be the result of an
elite education that provides a high salary upon graduation. Similarly, a graduate may have very
little debt but receive a high paying job upon completion of their degree. Due to the important
nature of this relationship, these variables are considered as a ratio of one another rather than
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separately. Similar methods have been used by the National Association of Student Financial Aid
Administrators (2018) and Institute for Financial Aid Professionals (2018).
I hypothesize that the debt to earnings ratio will be higher for students at four-year institutions
than at two-year institutions because students at two-year institutions will have less debt on average
and a quicker entry into the workforce. Similarly, I hypothesize that the debt to earnings ratio
will be higher at for-profit and private institutions than at not-for-profit and public institutions,
as for-profit and private institutions require the average student to take on more debt than their
not-for-profit and public counterparts, without clear evidence of equally increased earning potential.
17
CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS
This chapter summarizes the data used in the study, the source of this data, and how data are
applied. This chapter also lists the hypotheses being tested.
3.1 Hypotheses
3.1.1 Hypothesis 1
A: 150% time completion rates are lower at two-year institutions than at four-year institutions.
B: 150% time completion rates are lower at for-profit institutions than at not-for-profit institutions.
C: 150% time completion rates are lower at public institutions than at private institutions.
3.1.2 Hypothesis 2
A: Student loan default rates are higher at two-year institutions than at four-year institutions.
B: Student loan default rates are higher at for-profit institutions than at not-for-profit institutions.
C: Student loan default rates are higher at private institutions than at public institutions.
3.1.3 Hypothesis 3
A: The ratio of median debt of completers to mean post-baccalaureate earnings is higher at four-
year institutions than at two-year institutions.
B: The ratio of median debt of completers to mean post-baccalaureate earnings is higher at for-
profit institutions than at not-for-profit institutions.
C: The ratio of median debt of completers to mean post-baccalaureate earnings is higher at private
institutions than at public institutions.
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3.2 Data
The data used in this analysis are from the US Department of Education College Scorecard
dataset. The College Scorecard is a program of the USDE designed to increase transparency in
higher education, allowing the public to make more informed decisions when weighing choices
between institutions of higher education. Data are provided through federal reporting from institu-
tions, tax information, federal financial aid data, and accreditor performance data. The output of
this data is intended to be the College Scorecard, a condensed and user-friendly method of viewing
the overall data for a school. USDE has also made the back-end data available, which is used in this
project. The iteration used was the September 28, 2018 data with revised earnings and completion
rates. The dataset contains variables providing description of the institution, their accreditor, and
the demographics of students in a wide-ranging variety of measures.
The data represent a sample size of 7,175 institutions across the United States, overseen by both
regional and specialized accreditors. After removing all non-operating institutions from the list, the
sample size is 6,715 institutions. Finally, institutions were filtered by accreditor. The remaining
schools are all accredited by the seven main regional accreditors, narrowing the sample size to
3,548 schools accredited by the Middle States Commission on Higher Education, New England
Association of Schools and Colleges, Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, The Higher
Learning Commission, Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, Southern Association
of Colleges and Schools, Commission on Colleges, Western Association of Schools and Colleges,
Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges, Western Association of Schools and
Colleges, and Senior Colleges and Universities Commission. This sample allows for the comparison
of like accreditors and schools without controlling for programmatic or specialized accreditors or
programs. This sample also provides a clear understanding of the differences between reference
categories in the data.
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3.2.1 Variable descriptions
The following table shows the College Scorecard variables used, along with the description
provided by USDE in their accompanying data dictionary:
Table 3.1 Variables
Variable Name Description
OPEID 8-digit Office of Postsecondary Education ID for institution
INSTNM Institution name
ACCREDAGENCY Agency responsible for accreditation
PREDDEG Predominant degree granted
CONTROL Control of an institution
MN EARN WNE P10 Mean earnings of students 10 years after entry
MD EARN WNE P10 Median earnings of students 10 years after entry
GRAD DEBT MDN SUPP Median debt of completers
COMPL RPY 3YR RT SUPP 3-year repayment rate for completers
C150 L4 POOLED SUPP Completion rate at less-than-four-year institutions
C150 4 POOLED SUPP Completion rate at four-year institutions
Data in the College Scorecard dataset is provided by campus. Due to the variety of campus
sizes and the limited availability of data on certain campuses, USDE suppresses data from privacy-
sensitive samples with a denominator less than or equal to thirty students. This measure protects
the identities of individual students who could otherwise be found in such small samples. Variables
suppressed by USDE include mean and median earnings, graduate debt, repayment rates, and
pooled completion rates. Median earnings are reported for students who are not in school and are
working 10 years after they entered the degree program. The data used in this analysis are only
of students who completed the degree program in which they initially enrolled. Pooled completion
rates are reported for 150 percent of expected time to completion. This means that a student
enrolling in a four-year program will be included as ”completed” if they complete their degree
in four to six years (100% to 150%). Additionally, the completion data apply only to first-time,
full-time students.
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3.2.2 Dependent variables
Each set of hypotheses presented in this paper has a unique dependent variable. The dependent
variable for hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c - COMP.25P - equals 1 if a campus has a completion rate
greater than 0.25 and 0 otherwise. This variable was created using the C150 L4 POOLED SUPP
and C150 4 POOLED SUPP variables from the College Scorecard dataset.
The dependent variable for hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c - DEF.30M - equals 1 if a campus
has a student loan default rate below 0.30 and 0 otherwise. This variable was created using the
COMPL RPY 3YR RT SUPP variable from the College Scorecard dataset. DEFAULT was created
by taking 1 minus COMPL RPY 3YR RT SUPP to determine the total default and non-repayment
rate. This variable was then recoded as binary variable DEF.30M.
The dependent variable for hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c - RATIO1M - equals 1 if the debt
to earnings ratio of a campus is 1 or lower and 0 otherwise. This variable was created using
the GRAD DEBT MDN SUPP and MN EARN WNE P10 variables from the College Scorecard
dataset. DEBT.EARN.RATIO was created by dividing the median student debt of completers
by the mean earnings to create the debt to earnings ratio. This was then recoded into a binary
variable, RATIO1M.
3.2.3 Independent variables
Independent variables are held constant throughout each hypothesis tested. The independent
variable for hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a is PREDDEG, the predominant degree granted by the campus
as determined in the College Scorecard dataset. This variable equals 1 if a campuss primary degree
granted is a certificate, 2 if a campuss predominant degree granted is an associates degree, 3 if a
campuss primary degree granted is a bachelors degree, and 4 if a school is entirely graduate-degree
granting. All missing variables are coded as 0.
The independent variable for hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b is CONTROL, the control of the campus
as determined in the College Scorecard dataset. This variable equals 1 if the campus is publicly
controlled, 2 if the campus is privately owned and operated as a not-for-profit entity, and 3 if the
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campus is privately owned and operated as a for-profit entity. All missing variables are coded as
0. This variable is referred to as institutional ownership throughout this writing.
The independent variable for hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 3c is also CONTROL from the College
Scorecard dataset. This data is recoded to equal 1 if the campus is privately controlled, whether
for-profit or not-for-profit. Publicly owned campuses equal 2 in this data. All missing variables are
coded as 0. This variable is referred to as profit structure throughout this writing.
3.3 Methods
I use logistic regression as the primary method of analysis for evaluating compliance with
proposed bright lines. The pass/fail nature of bright lines creates a binary outcome in the dependent
variable. Logistic regression allows for the use of binomial dependent variables while predicting
values for each data point. This produces a result similar to multiple linear regression, but with
a better fit to the data. Logistic regression also provides an understanding of the strength and
direction of effect on the dependent variable. In conjunction with levels of significance, I am able
to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis for each model. Ordinary least squares regressions are
used to show the natural relationships between variables prior to implementing bright lines.
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter explores the results of logistic regressions highlighting the impact of the indepen-
dent variables on the dependent variables.
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Completion Rate
Table 4.1 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with completion rate as the
dependent variable and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure, and institutional
ownership as the independent variables. This table shows that there is a positive relationship
between predominant degree granted and completion rate, a negative relationship between for-
profit institutions and completion rate, and a negative relationship between public institutions and
completion rate. Appendix figure A.1 provides a graph of these relationships.
Table 4.1 Completion rate regressed on all independent variables (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.2635 0.0175 15.09 0.0000
PREDDEG 0.1015 0.0057 17.91 0.0000
PROFIT -0.1861 0.0132 -14.13 0.0000
PUBLIC -0.1480 0.0081 -18.24 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.334, RSS = 87.718, RMSE = 0.175
Table 4.2 shows the results of a logistic regression run with COMP.25P as the dependent variable
and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure, and institutional ownership as the
independent variables. This table shows that there is a positive relationship between predominant
degree granted and meeting the bright line for completion rate for associate’s and bachelor’s pro-
grams and a negative relationship between predominant degree granted and meeting the bright line
for completion rate for graduate programs. The graph also shows a negative relationship between
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for-profit institutions and meeting the bright line for completion rate, and a negative relationship
between public institutions and meeting this bright line.
Table 4.2 Completion rate regressed on all independent variables (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.5269 0.1185 -4.45 0.0000
associates 0.4711 0.1147 4.11 0.0000
bachelors 2.3021 0.1154 19.94 0.0000
graduate -4.4623 1.0092 -4.42 0.0000
forprofit -1.5572 0.1390 -11.20 0.0000
public -0.0466 0.1056 -0.44 0.6588
Pseudo R-squared = 0.244, AIC = 3618.8, False positives = 593, False negatives = 331,
Specificity = 0.722, Sensitivity = 0.766, Accuracy = 0.740
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1A
Table 4.3 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with completion rate as
the dependent variable and predominant degree granted as the independent variable. This table
shows that there is a positive relationship between predominant degree granted and completion
rate. Appendix figure A.2 supports this finding, showing that, as predominant degree granted
increases, the expected completion rate also increases.
Table 4.3 Completion rate regressed on predominant degree granted (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0318 0.0132 2.40 0.0165
PREDDEG 0.1563 0.0051 30.40 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.243, RSS = 99.771, RMSE = 0.186
Table 4.4 shows the results of a logistic regression run with COMP.25P as the dependent
variable and predominant degree granted (certificate, associate’s, bachelor’s) as the independent
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Table 4.4 Completion rate regressed on predominant degree granted (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.8025 0.0882 -9.10 0.0000
associates 0.5686 0.1104 5.15 0.0000
bachelors 2.3393 0.1070 21.86 0.0000
graduate -4.2537 1.0068 -4.22 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.212, AIC = 3771.2, False positives = 593, False negatives = 331,
Specificity = 0.722, Sensitivity = 0.766, Accuracy = 0.740
variable. COMP.25P is a binary variable equaling 1 if the campus’s completion rate is greater than
or equal to 0.25 and 0 if the completion rate is below 0.25. Certificate completion rate is held out of
the model as the reference variable. This table shows that there is a positive relationship between
predominant degree granted and ability to meet the bright line of 25 percent or higher completion
rate for associate’s and bachelor’s degrees, but a negative relationship for primarily graduate degree
granting institutions.
4.1.2 Hypothesis 1B
Table 4.5 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with completion rate
as the dependent variable and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. This
table shows that there is a negative relationship between for-profit structures and completion rate.
This suggests that for-profit campuses, on average, have lower completion rates than not-for-profit
campuses. Appendix figure A.3 supports this finding, showing a lower expected completion rate
for for-profit campuses.
Table 4.6 shows the results of a logistic regression run with COMP.25P as the dependent
variable and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. Not-for-profit institutions
are held out of the model as the reference variable. This table shows that for-profit institutions are
less likely to meet the 25 percent bright line for completion rate than not-for profit institutions.
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Table 4.5 Completion rate regressed on institutional profit structure (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.4283 0.0041 103.87 0.0000
PROFIT -0.1021 0.0148 -6.88 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.016, RSS = 129.710, RMSE = 0.212
Table 4.6 Completion rate regressed on institutional profit structure (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.5756 0.0373 15.43 0.0000
forprofit -1.3505 0.1105 -12.22 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.034, AIC = 4614.7, False positives = 135, False negatives = 1123,
Specificity = 0.937, Sensitivity = 0.207, Accuracy = 0.645
4.1.3 Hypothesis 1C
Table 4.7 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with completion rate as
the dependent variable and institutional ownership as the independent variable. This table shows
that there is a negative relationship between public ownership of a campus and completion rate.
This suggests that publicly owned campuses, on average, have lower completion rates than privately
owned campuses. Appendix figure A.4 supports this finding, showing a lower expected completion
rate for public campuses.
Table 4.7 Completion rate regressed on institutional ownership (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.5213 0.0054 97.09 0.0000
PUBLIC -0.1841 0.0073 -25.38 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.183, RSS = 107.709, RMSE = 0.194
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Table 4.8 Completion rate regressed on institutional ownership (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.5019 0.0481 10.44 0.0000
public -0.1909 0.0687 -2.78 0.0054
Pseudo R-squared = 0.002, AIC = 4769.3, False positives = 1, False negatives = 1416, Specificity
= 1.000, Sensitivity = 0.000, Accuracy = 0.601
Table 4.8 shows the results of a logistic regression run with COMP.25P as the dependent variable
and institutional control as the independent variable. Privately controlled institutions are held out
of the model as the reference variable. This table shows that publicly owned institutions are less
likely to meet the 25 percent bright line for completion rate than privately owned institutions.
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Student Loan Default Rate
Table 4.9 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with student loan default
rate as the dependent variable and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure, and
institutional ownership as the independent variables. This table shows that there is a negative rela-
tionship between predominant degree granted and student loan default rate, a positive relationship
between for-profit institutions and student loan default rate, and a positive relationship between
public institutions and student loan default rate. Appendix figure A.5 provides a graph of these
relationships.
Table 4.9 Student loan default rate regressed on all independent variables (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.4222 0.0087 48.70 0.0000
PREDDEG -0.0513 0.0028 -18.48 0.0000
PROFIT 0.2121 0.0080 26.61 0.0000
PUBLIC 0.0481 0.0055 8.81 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.335, RSS = 50.425, RMSE = 0.130
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Table 4.10 shows the results of a logistic regression run with DEF.30M as the dependent variable
and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure, and institutional ownership as the
independent variables. DEF.30M is a binary variable equaling 1 if the school’s student loan default
rate is less than or equal to 0.30 and 0 if the default rate is above .30. Certificate completion rate is
held out of the model as the reference variable. This table shows that there is a positive relationship
between predominant degree granted and meeting the bright line for student loan default rate for
all program types. The graph shows a negative relationship between for-profit institutions and
meeting this bright line, and a negative relationship between public institutions and meeting this
bright line.
Table 4.10 Student loan default rate regressed on all independent variables (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -1.2615 0.1650 -7.64 0.0000
associates 0.1150 0.1805 0.64 0.5240
bachelors 2.0423 0.1602 12.75 0.0000
graduate 2.2330 0.5315 4.20 0.0000
forprofit -3.2429 0.2597 -12.48 0.0000
public -0.4680 0.0982 -4.77 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.237, AIC = 3075, False positives = 181, False negatives = 559, Specificity
= 0.850, Sensitivity = 0.682, Accuracy = 0.751
4.2.1 Hypothesis 2A
Table 4.11 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with student loan default
rate as the dependent variable and predominant degree granted as the independent variable. This
table shows that there is a negative relationship between predominant degree granted and student
loan default rate. Appendix figure A.6 supports this finding, showing that, as predominant degree
granted increases, the expected student loan default rate decreases.
Table 4.12 shows the results of a logistic regression run with DEF.30M as the dependent vari-
able and predominant degree granted as the independent variable. DEF.30M is a binary variable
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Table 4.11 Student loan default rate regressed on predominant degree granted (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.5238 0.0073 71.38 0.0000
PREDDEG -0.0721 0.0029 -25.06 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.174, RSS = 62.652, RMSE = 0.145
Table 4.12 Student loan default rate regressed on predominant degree granted (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -1.9665 0.1440 -13.66 0.0000
associates 0.2475 0.1763 1.40 0.1603
bachelors 2.3194 0.1519 15.27 0.0000
graduate 2.3719 0.4786 4.96 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.159, AIC = 3382.9, False positives = 169, False negatives = 731,
Specificity = 0.860, Sensitivity = 0.585, Accuracy = 0.697
equaling 1 if the school’s student loan default rate is less than or equal to 0.30 and 0 if the student
loan default rate is above 0.30. Certificate completion rate is held out of the model as the reference
variable. This table shows that there is a positive relationship between predominant degree granted
and the ability to meet the bright line for student loan default rates for all degree types, however
the coefficient for associate’s degree is not statistically significant.
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2B
Table 4.13 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with student loan default
rate as the dependent variable and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. This
table shows that there is a positive relationship between for-profit structures and student loan
default rate. This suggests that for-profit campuses, on average, have higher student loan default
rates than not-for-profit campuses. Appendix figure A.7 supports this finding, showing a higher
expected student loan default rate for for-profit campuses.
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Table 4.13 Student loan default rate regressed on institutional profit structure (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.3238 0.0028 115.20 0.0000
PROFIT 0.2126 0.0076 27.79 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.206, RSS = 60.233, RMSE = 0.142
Table 4.14 Student loan default rate regressed on institutional profit structure (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.1427 0.0396 -3.61 0.0003
forprofit -2.9747 0.2509 -11.85 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.081, AIC = 3693.1, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA,
Specificity = NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
Table 4.14 shows the results of a logistic regression run with DEF.30M as the dependent variable
and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. Not-for-profit institutions are held
out of the model as the reference variable. This table shows that for-profit institutions have a lower
capability of meeting the bright line set for student loan default rates, on average, than not-for
profit institutions.
4.2.3 Hypothesis 2C
Table 4.15 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with student loan default
rate as the dependent variable and institutional ownership as the independent variable. This table
shows that there is a positive relationship between public ownership of a campus and student loan
default rate. This suggests that publicly owned campuses have, on average, higher student loan
default rates than privately owned campuses. Appendix figure A.8 supports this finding, showing
a lower expected student loan default rate for public campuses. It should be noted that both the
regression and the graph show very small effect sizes, suggesting the difference is marginal.
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Table 4.15 Student loan default rate regressed on institutional ownership (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.3467 0.0041 84.69 0.0000
PUBLIC 0.0118 0.0059 2.02 0.0436
Adjusted R-squared = 0.001, RSS = 75.804, RMSE = 0.160
Table 4.16 Student loan default rate regressed on institutional ownership (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.0762 0.0513 -1.49 0.1374
public -0.6326 0.0759 -8.34 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared = 0.018, AIC = 3948.3, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA,
Specificity = NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
Table 4.16 shows the results of a logistic regression run with DEF.30M as the dependent variable
and institutional ownership as the independent variable. Privately owned institutions are held out
of the model as the reference variable. This table shows that publicly owned institutions have
a lower capability of meeting the bright line set for student loan default rates, on average, than
privately owned institutions.
4.3 Hypothesis 3: Debt to Earnings Ratio
Table 4.17 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with debt to earnings
ratio as the dependent variable and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure,
and institutional ownership as the independent variables. This table shows that there is a positive
relationship between predominant degree granted and debt to earnings ratio, a positive relationship
between for-profit institutions and debt to earnings ratio, and a negative relationship between public
institutions and debt to earnings ratio. Appendix figure A.9 provides a graph of these relationships.
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Table 4.17 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on all independent variables (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.3881 0.0118 32.79 0.0000
PREDDEG 0.0442 0.0038 11.70 0.0000
PROFIT 0.1584 0.0106 14.88 0.0000
PUBLIC -0.1296 0.0072 -17.91 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.281, RSS = 88.375, RMSE = 0.172
Table 4.18 shows the results of a logistic regression run with RATIO1M as the dependent
variable and predominant degree granted, institutional profit structure, and institutional ownership
as the independent variables. The only statistically significant coefficient in this model is the
coefficient on institutional ownership, which suggest that there is a positive relationship between
publicly owned institutions and the ability to meet the bright line.
Table 4.18 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on all independent variables (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 5.4228 1.0443 5.19 0.0000
associates -0.3080 1.2325 -0.25 0.8026
bachelors -1.8387 1.0362 -1.77 0.0760
graduate 11.8939 754.1288 0.02 0.9874
forprofit 0.3844 0.5509 0.70 0.4854
public 1.0681 0.4482 2.38 0.0172
Pseudo R-squared = 0.071, AIC = 3075, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA, Specificity
= NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
4.3.1 Hypothesis 3A
Table 4.19 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with debt to earnings
ratio as the dependent variable and predominant degree granted as the independent variable. This
table shows that there is a positive relationship between predominant degree granted and debt to
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earnings ratio. Appendix figure A.10 supports this finding, showing that, as predominant degree
granted increases, the expected debt to earnings ratio increases.
Table 4.19 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on predominant degree granted (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.3378 0.0102 33.05 0.0000
PREDDEG 0.0477 0.0040 11.94 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.045, RSS = 117.353, RMSE = 0.198
Table 4.20 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on predominant degree granted (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 6.0868 1.0011 6.08 0.0000
associates -0.1427 1.2262 -0.12 0.9074
bachelors -2.2208 1.0152 -2.19 0.0287
graduate 11.4793 761.3679 0.02 0.9880
Pseudo R-squared = 0.055, AIC = 401.06, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA,
Specificity = NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
Table 4.20 shows the results of a logistic regression run with RATIO1M as the dependent
variable and predominant degree granted as the independent variable. RATIO1M is a binary
variable equaling 1 if the school’s debt to income ratio is less than 1 and 0 if the debt to income
ratio is greater than or equal to 1. Graduate degree is held out of the model as the reference
variable. This table does not have enough statistically significant figures to provide evidence of a
bright line’s effectiveness.
4.3.2 Hypothesis 3B
Table 4.21 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with debt to earnings
ratio as the dependent variable and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. This
table shows that there is a positive relationship between for-profit structures and debt to earnings
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ratio. This suggests that for-profit campuses, on average, have higher debt to earnings ratios than
not-for-profit campuses. Appendix figure A.11 supports this finding, showing higher expected debt
to earnings ratios for for-profit campuses.
Table 4.21 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on institutional profit structure (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.4247 0.0037 113.46 0.0000
PROFIT 0.2056 0.0103 19.97 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.118, RSS = 108.467, RMSE = 0.191
Table 4.22 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on institutional profit structure (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 4.2916 0.1702 25.22 0.0000
forprofit 0.2908 0.5306 0.55 0.5837
Pseudo R-squared = 0.001, AIC = 419.59, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA,
Specificity = NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
Table 4.22 shows the results of a logistic regression run with RATIO1M as the dependent
variable and institutional profit structure as the independent variable. Not-for-profit institutions
are held out as the reference variable. This table cannot be interpreted, as the coefficient on
institutional profit structure is not statistically significant.
4.3.3 Hypothesis 3C
Table 4.23 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression run with debt to income
ratio as the dependent variable and institutional ownership as the independent variable. This table
shows that there is a negative relationship between public ownership of a campus and debt to
income ratio. This suggests that publicly owned campuses, on average, have lower debt to income
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ratios than privately owned campuses. Appendix figure A.12 supports this finding, showing a lower
expected debt to income ratio for public campuses.
Table 4.23 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on institutional ownership (OLS)
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.5432 0.0046 118.58 0.0000
PUBLIC -0.1884 0.0066 -28.64 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared = 0.215, RSS = 96.452, RMSE = 0.180
Table 4.24 Debt to earnings ratio regressed on institutional ownership (Logit)
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 3.8521 0.1786 21.56 0.0000
public 1.4757 0.4189 3.52 0.0004
Pseudo R-squared = 0.039, AIC = 403.84, False positives = NA, False negatives = NA,
Specificity = NA, Sensitivity = NA, Accuracy = NA
Table 4.24 shows the results of a logistic regression run with RATIO1M as the dependent
variable and institutional ownership as the independent variable. Privately controlled institutions
are held out as the reference variable. This table shows that public institutions are, on average,
more capable of meeting the bright line for debt to earnings ratio than private institutions.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Conclusion
This paper extends the research on bright-line indicators in higher education accreditation by
shifting the conversation away from abstract ideas and toward concrete solutions. I argue using
punctuated equilibrium theory that there is an impending shift away from accreditor control, plac-
ing more power in the hands of the US Department of Education. This shift toward bright lines
will cause a dramatic shock to the higher education system. I explain the impact of bright lines on
postsecondary institutions, controlling for predominant degree granted, institutional profit struc-
ture, and institutional ownership. Relating to predominant degree granted, I find that institutions
granting two-year degrees have lower completion rates, higher student loan default rates, and lower
debt to earnings ratios than their two-year counterparts. These findings allow me to reject my null
hypotheses for 1A, 2A, and 3A. Institutional profit structure results suggest that for-profit institu-
tions have lower completion rates, higher student loan default rates, and higher debt to earnings
ratios. These findings allow me to reject my null hypotheses for 1B, 2B, and 3B. Finally, insti-
tutional ownership results suggest that publicly owned institutions have lower completion rates,
higher student loan default rates, and lower debt to earnings ratios. These findings allow me to
reject my null hypotheses for 1C, 2C, and 3C.
5.1.1 Completion rate bright line
A bright line stating that institutions must have a completion rate greater than 25 percent to
be accredited shows that it would disproportionately affect programs of various lengths. Programs
issuing primarily four-year degrees would be least affected by this bright line, while two-year pro-
grams would see a larger effect on their accreditation likelihood. Institutions granting primarily
graduate degrees would be the most adversely impacted. This same bright line would have a much
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larger negative impact on for-profit programs than not-for-profit programs, causing many for-profit
programs to lose their accreditation. There would also be a negative effect for public institutions,
more so than private institutions. These disproportionate impacts would need to be controlled for
in any bright-line equation.
5.1.2 Student loan default rate bright line
A bright line stating that institutions must have a student loan default rate less than 30 per-
cent to be accredited would have a similar effect on programs of all length. There is a positive
effect for bachelor’s and graduate-degree granting programs, as seen in the logistic regression in
table 4.8. However, for-profit institutions would be disproportionately affected by this bright line,
with significantly lower passage rates than not-for-profit institutions. Public institutions would be
similarly disadvantaged, with private institutions faring significantly better on this bright line.
5.1.3 Debt to earnings ratio bright line
A bright line stating that graduates of an institution must have an average debt to earnings
ratio less than one proved to be an ineffective bright line by most standards. The model comparing
predominant degree granted showed almost no statistical significance, as did the model compar-
ing for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. The only statistically significant finding regarding
this bright line is that publicly owned institutions fare much better than their privately owned
counterparts in holding their debt to earnings ratio below one.
5.2 Discussion
The broad implication of this paper suggests that currently recommended bright lines would
disproportionately impact institutions in ways that policymakers may tend to overlook. If a period
of punctuated equilibrium is indeed on the horizon, policymakers must focus on the true goals of
implementing bright lines. If we can ultimately agree that institutions must meet these thresholds
in order to be considered successful, we must prepare for the economic consequences of school
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closings, causing students and faculty to flood the residual higher education market. If nothing
else, this research paints a clear picture of the analysis required for any proposed bright lines, setting
a precedent for analyzing the effect of each bright line on various groups in higher education. Future
research on this topic must continue to evolve with changing calls for reform, keeping a vigilant
eye on the Department of Education and its affiliated groups as they navigate a trying time in
education policy.
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APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure .1 Completion rate by all independent variables
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Figure .2 Completion rate by predominant degree granted
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Figure .3 Completion rate by profit structure
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Figure .4 Completion rate by institutional ownership
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Figure .5 Student loan default rate by all independent variables
47
Figure .6 Student loan default rate by predominant degree granted
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Figure .7 Student loan default rate by profit structure
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Figure .8 Student loan default rate by institutional ownership
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Figure .9 Debt to earnings ratio by all independent variables
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Figure .10 Debt to earnings ratio by predominant degree granted
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Figure .11 Debt to earnings ratio by profit structure
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Figure .12 Debt to earnings ratio by institutional ownership
